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Abstract
We introduce and investigate a range of general notions of a game.
Our principal notion is based on a set of agents modifying a relational
structure in a discrete evolution sequence. We also introduce and study
a variety of ways to model partial and erroneous information in the
setting. We discuss the connection of the related general setting to logic
and computation formalisms, with emphasis on the recently introduced
Turing-complete logic based on game-theoretic semantics.
1 Introduction
We introduce and investigate a range general formalisations of the notion of
a game. Games here refer to multiplayer interaction systems as conceived in,
e.g., the field of multiagent systems. Our main formalisation is an iterative
setting where the players jointly modify a relational structure in a discrete
sequence of steps. The approach is quite general, and generality is indeed
one of our principal aims.
To gain intuition into the setting, the relational structures can be considered,
e.g., to represent the board of some board game—chess for example—at
different points of time. The individual pawns and other pieces can then be
naturally modeled by constant symbols or singleton predicates, for example.
The players move the pieces about, i.e., modify the relational structure.
In the general setting, we put no limitations to what the modifications could
be like in a particular scenario. It may be possible to remove domain elements
and introduce new ones to the structures. Likewise, it may be possible to
remove tuples from the relations of the structures and introduce new ones.
Each game round corresponds intuitively to a new, modified structure. In
any particular modeling scenario, only the game rules restrict the set of
allowed modifications in each round. A function modeling chance is also
included into the setting to enable investigations requiring related features
and capacities.
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Board games, however, are only a starting point. The setting we define
is intended to provide a very general modeling framework. The framework
aims to offer a wide range of options for studying different kinds of interaction
scenarios involving a concrete dynamic environment (the changing relational
structures) and a set of agents acting in that environment. This will then
be connected to a very general approch to logic using a powerful, Turing-
complete logic formalism introduced recently in [7]. The logic provides a full
range of ways to formally control the new setting.
Using relational structures as the starting point of our formal systems has
two principal advantages. Firstly, relational structures are highly general
as well as natural, being able to model more or less everything in a flexible
way. Secondly, relational structures enable us to directly use different logics
to control the time evolution and flow of changing structures.
Logic plays a crucial role in our study. We first observe that the Turing-
complete logic L of [7] is intimately connected to our main formalisation
of the notion of a game. Indeed, the evaluation of formulae via the game-
theoretic semantics of L is all about modifying relational strucures, so L can
be viewed as a particular game system included in our formal framework of
games. Conversely, we briefly analyse ways to directly simulate formal game
evolutions of our framework within the setting of L. Moreover, we discuss
further general ways to control game systems via logic, including, e.g., ways
of representing knowledge of agents and beyond.
In addition to obviously considering perfect information scenarios, we intro-
duce a simple and natural yet highly general way to deal with partial and
potentially false information. The approach is based on two maps. The per-
ception map provides—based on the current relational structure—a mental
model that reflects the way an agent sees the actual current world (i.e., the
current relational structure) and other relevant factors concerning the agent.
The agent then acts, in one way or another, using the mental model to decide
upon the particular course of action. The chosen actions can depend on the
agent’s (possibly limited) reasoning capacities. All this is captured formally
by a decision map that takes the mental model as an input and outputs
a specific action. The mental model can be a relational structure, but we
also consider more elaborate approaches to better account for incomplete
information issues.
To supplement our principal notion of a system, we also consider some gen-
eralizations. For example, we consider ways to abstract away the discrete
iteration steps leading from a structure to another. This gives rise to a po-
tentially continuous flow of structures. Furthermore, the approach provides
a way to model situations with infinite past, cyclic time, et cetera.
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There is of course a vast literature investigating notions related to our study,
especially in the field of multiagent systems [16]. The concurrent game mod-
els used in Alternating-time temporal logic [1] relate to our notion of a game
system, but the main focus is not on relational structures there. In first-order
temporal logics (see, e.g., [6] and the references therein), however, the setting
typically involves a flow of relational structures. Formalisms that bear some
similarity to the original motivations of the logic L, as given in [7], include,
e.g., Abstract State Machines [3], but that approach is—unlike L—only re-
motely related to our study of multiagent interactions. The idea that the
general notion of a game should be formulated in terms of agents jointly
modifying a relational structure (or model) has been stated in [8, 9] and
formulated in further detail in [13]. We elaborate on those suggestions, de-
veloping an elaborate notion of a game system and drawing links with logic.
This leads to a framework with a reasonably flexible capacity to model more
or less every possible dynamic interaction scenario.
Our approach is foundational and thus we provide relatively detailed dis-
cussions of most definitions we give, justifying the theoretical and formal
choices. After the brief technical preliminaries in Section 2, we introduce
and discuss formal notions of a system (i.e., notions of a game or interaction
framework) in Section 3. In Section 4 we then draw connections to logic,
especially the Turing-complete logic L, but also other systems. In addition
to considering the connections of L to games, we also directly analyse some
of the more fundamental properties of the logic.
2 Preliminaries
The power set of a set S is denoted by P(S). For any signature σ, the empty
σ-structure is in general allowed. Note that the empty sructure is not the
same object as ∅. We suppose this holds holds even if σ = ∅.
A structure (or model) typically refers to a first-order model as conceived in
standard logic. However, below structures can also be more general objects,
such as—to name a few of the many possibilities—sets or classes of first-
order structures; sets of logical formulas; first-order models with relations
having probabilistic weights on the relation tuples; or pairs (B, f) where B
is a first-order model and f and assignment function mapping some set of
variable symbols into the domain of B. This generality can be advantageous.
For example, a set of first-order structures can represent a set of conceived
possible worlds, while a reasonable setting for modeling quantum phenomena
could be to consider sets of first-order models, each model having a complex
number weight.1 However, standard relational first-order models are by far
1In one simple case, the domain of the first-order models in that setting would corre-
spond to space coordinates.
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the most important notion of a structure that we consider below, providing
background intuitions for most of the discussed technical as well as conceptual
issues. However, we use the word model as a synonym for structure, and refer
to first-order models when it is indeed only standard first-order models that
we are considering.
We assume that each structure can be associated with a signature σ that
relates to the objects of that structure. In the paradigmatic case of standard
first-order models, the signature is as defined in standard logic. We define
relational first-order models to have a purely relational signature, so con-
stant symbols and obviously function symbols are not included. First-order
models are not assumed to be finite by default, as is sometimes the case in
mathematics relating to computation (especially finite model theory).
3 Systems
In this section we define a general notion of a system. We begin with some
preliminary definitions.
Consider a triple (σ,A, I), where σ is a signature, A a set of actions and
I a set of agents (or agent names). Let S be a set of σ-structures. An
(S,A, I)-sequence is a finite sequence
(B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,Bk,ak)
where Bi ∈ S and ai ∈ A
I for each i ≤ k. We note that also the empty
sequence, denoted by ǫ, is considered an (S,A, I)-sequence.
Definition 3.1. A system frame base over (σ,A, I) is a pair (S,F ) such that
the following conditions hold:
1. S is a set of σ-structures.
2. F is a function F : T → P(S), where T is some subset of the set of
all (S,A, I)-sequences.
Intuitively, a system frame base consists of a set S of possible worlds and
a function F that (nondeterministically) indicates how finite sequences of
possible worlds are allowed to evolve to longer sequences. The sequences
correspond to time evolutions of possible worlds.
In a bit more detail, consider a sequence
(B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,Bk−1,ak−1,Bk)
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of possible worlds Bi and (tuples of) actions ai ∈ A
I carried out2 in those
possible worlds. This sequence ends with the possible world Bk that could
be considered the current possible world, or the current state of affairs. Now,
if the tuple of actions ak ∈ A
I is carried out in the current possible world
Bk, we get the extended sequence
(B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,Bk,ak).
Now the function F gives the set
F
(
(B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,Bk,ak)
)
of new possible worlds, and one these worlds will ultimately become the new
current possible world. Note indeed that F does not deterministically give a
single new current possible world, but instead only a set of new candidates.
In the special case where F outputs the empty set, it is natural to interpret
the situation so that the actions ak lead to termination of the evolution.
Note also that the domain of the function F is specified to be a subset T
of the set of all (S,A, I)-sequences, with no particular restrictions on T .
Thus it can happen that F is defined even on some (S,A, I)-sequences that
do not belong to the set TF of all possible sequences that F gives rise to.
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This feature could of course be avoided by putting extra conditions on F .
But, this extra flexibility and generality in the definition of F can also be
beneficial.4
Since F is indeed a partial function on the set of (S,A, I)-sequences, there
indeed may be cases where F gives no output. This is subtly different from
the case where F outputs the empty set. Supposing F is undefined on the
input t = (B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,Bk,ak), we can interpret this to mean, e.g.,
that the tuple ak contains some forbidden actions in the possible world Bk
when the history leading to Bk is (B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,Bk−1,ak−1). If an
evolution terminates this way due a tuple of actions that is not allowed,
the situation is indeed subtly different from termination resulting in from
F outputting ∅ (which corresponds to termination via an allowed tuple of
actions). Of course—in different scenarios—one could talk about possible or
available actions rather than allowed and forbidden actions. It all depends
on the background interpretations.
2The actions in ai can most naturally be considered to be carried simultaneously in
Bi. However, interpreting these actions simultaneous is by no means the only possibility.
3The set TF is the set of sequences obtained by starting from the empty sequence ǫ
and inductively generating all possible sequences according to what F outputs.
4For example, we could define some function Fr according to some natural behaviour
restriction r and then study what kinds of evolutions the function Fr would allow when
starting from a sequence t 6= ∅ such that t 6∈ TFr .
5
It is often natural to allow non-actions in addition to actions. Then we can
define A so that it contains a special symbol (or perhaps many special sym-
bols) that correspond to taking no action whatsoever. For example, suppose
A = {x, y} with x indicating no action taken and y corresponding to some
action. Let I = {0, 1}. Then the tuples (x, x), (x, y) and (y, x) correspond
to situations with non-actions. If F is undefined, say, on some sequence
ending with (x, x), then this can correspond for example to a scenario where
at least one action in the action tuple is required and the total non-action
tuple (x, x) is simply not allowed or somehow impossible.
Now, F is indeed nondeterministic in the sense that it only gives a set of new
possible worlds in a frame base (S,F ). Therefore, to decide which one of the
new possible worlds given by F becomes the new current possible world, we
define the notion of a system frame. The key is simply to define a choice
function G that picks a new possible world from the set of possibilities given
by F .
Definition 3.2. A system frame over (σ,A, I) is triple (S,F,G) such that
the following conditions hold:
1. (S,F ) is a system frame base as defined above.
2. G : E → S ∪ {end} is a function with E ⊆ T ×P(S) where T is the
set of all (S,A, I)-sequences. For all inputs (t,W ) where G is defined
and G((t,W )) 6= end, we require that G((t,W )) ∈W .
Intuitively, G simply chooses one option from the set W of possible worlds
given by F , and this choice depends also on the history t ∈ T . When
G outputs end, the interpretation can be that G terminates the evolution
of the underlying system. When G is undefined, we can interpret this for
example to indicate that G has no resources to determine the output. Note
also that G is undefined or outputs end always when F outputs ∅. This
reflects the idea that if evolution is terminated due to F , then G complies
with this and the evolution indeed will not continue.
The background intuitions between F and G are different; while F provides
a set of restrictions on how a system could potentially evolve, G determines,
within those restrictions, how the system then actually evolves. Thus F can
be seen as providing the rules how a system must evolve, and G is a bit like,
e.g., luck or chance that then determines what happens within the allowed
constraints. More on the interpretation of F and G (and beyond) will be
given later on.
We are now ready to define the notion of a system. To this end, we first
define that a structure-ended (S,A, I)-sequence is any sequence that can be
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obtained by extending an (S,A, I)-sequence by some structure in S. More
formally, a structure ended (S,A, I)-sequence is a sequence
(B0,a0, . . . ,Bk−1,ak−1,Bk)
where (B0,a0, . . . ,Bk−1,ak−1) is an (S,A, I)-sequence and Bk ∈ S with
k ≥ 0. We then define the notion of a system. This amounts to adding
agents fi that act (choose actions in A) in each current possible world.
Definition 3.3. A system over (σ,A, I) is a structure (S,F,G, (fi)i∈I) de-
fined as follows.
1. (S,F,G) is a system frame as defined above.
2. Every fi is a function fi : Vi → A where Vi is a subset of the set of all
structure-ended (S,A, I)-sequences.
Agents are partial functions on the set of structure-ended (S,A, I)-sequences.
Intuitively, an agent makes choices in models of S based on the current model
Bk and also the (S,A, I)-sequence that gave rise to that model. If an agent
is undefined on some entry, this can perhaps most naturally be interpreted
so that the entry is irrelevant for the underlying study,5 to give one option.
If an agent fi gets permanently removed from the system for some reason,
then it can still be technically desirable to keep fi defined on sequences that
extend further to the future in order to enable longer and longer evolutions to
be free of entries where functions have no defined value.6 The removed agent
can, for example, systematically output some special non-action symbol (say,
d ∈ A). Similar considerations can concern agents that have not yet entered
the system, or have temporarily left the system. These can be associated
with different symbols (say, u ∈ A and t ∈ A). An agent who is present,
but chooses not to act, would output some yet another non-action symbol.
Using special outputs for non-actions has the benefit that we can indeed
distinguish reasons why the agent is inactive.
It is at this stage quite clear that together withG, the agents fj make systems
evolve within the constraints given by F . The agents act in a possible world
Bi, and then F determines, based on the actions, a set W of potential new
possible worlds. The actual new possible world is then chosen from W by G.
5The same interpretation for the cases where F or G is undefined is also important.
Indeed, one reason for allowing F , G and each fi to be partial functions is to enable finite
(or otherwise limited) systems to be defined.
6Some crucial action tuple ai = (fj(ti))j∈I (where ti is a structure-ended (S,A, I)-
sequence) can then have all its entries defined even if some agents j ∈ I are not present
in the last world of ti.
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The set of finite evolutions of a system (S,F,G, (fi)i∈I) is the set that con-
tains all structure-ended (S,A, I)-sequences
(B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,Bk−1,ak−1,Bk)
such that B0 = G((ǫ, F (ǫ))) and the following conditions hold for each i
such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1:
1. ai =
(
fj
(
(B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ,ai−1,Bi)
) )
j ∈ I
2. Bi+1 = G
( (
(B0,a0, . . . ,Bi,ai), F ((B0,a0, . . . ,Bi,ai))
) )
.
Also the empty sequence is a finite evolution. Infinite evolutions are defined
in the analogous way to be infinite sequences (B0,a0,B1,a1, . . . ) of the
ordinal length ω and satisfying the above conditions 1 and 2 with B0 =
G((ǫ, F (ǫ))).
If B = (S,F,G, (fi)i∈I) is a system and E a structure-ended (S,A, I)-
sequence, then (B, E) is called an instance. If E is also a finite evolution of
the system, we may call (B, E) a realizable instance. An instance (realizable
or not) can also be called a pointed system in analogy with pointed models
in modal logic. The last structure Bk of E is called the current structure or
current world of (B, E) (and also of E). The set S of B = (S,F,G, (fi)i∈I)
is called the domain or universe of B (and also the domain of the system
frame base (S,F ) and system frame (S,F,G)).
Systems (and frames and frame bases) where all functions are total are called
strongly regular. We below analyse systems, and occasionally ignore techni-
cally anomalous features arising in systems that are not strongly regular.
3.1 On interpretations of systems
While there are numerous natural interpretations of systems as defined here,
the following rather ambitious interpretation stands out. A system frame
base (S,F ) of a system (S,F,G, (fi)i∈I) can be interpreted to represent the
material or physical part of the system, while G and the functions fi are the
non-physical or non-material part. The functions fi can indeed be considered
to be individual agents,7 while G can be regarded as some kind of a high
7The functions fi encode behaviour strategies of agents and the indices in I can be
thought to provide agent names or something of that sort, a unique name (or index) for
each agent. If desired, it is of course possible to construct a physical counterpart (a body)
for an agent and encode it into the structures in S. The body need not necessarily be a
connected or somehow local pattern. One natural choice is to pick a new relation symbol
Ri for each agent index i ∈ I to represent the body. But that is just one choice. The
related function fi can in suitable cases be modeled by letting some part of the encoding
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external controller—or perhaps chance or luck—that determines the ultimate
evolutive behaviour of the system. The agents pick actions from the set A,
and based on the actions, F determines a set of new possible worlds. The
actual new world is then picked by G from that set. It is natural to consider
F to correspond to physical constraints within which the evolution happens,
while G is a more abstract (perhaps intuitively non-physical), chance-like
entity.8
Within the collection of various interpretations, it is highly natural to con-
sider systems where the tuples ai of agents’ choices are determined by the cur-
rent structure Bi, as opposed to entire sequence (B0,a0, . . . ,Bi−1,ai−1,Bi)
ending with Bi. This of course implies that for each j ∈ I, there exists a
function hj such that
fj((B0,a0, . . . ,Bi−1,ai−1,Bi)) = hj(Bi)
holds for every i. Note that for each structure Bi ∈ S, the function fj must
be defined either on every structure-ended sequence ending with Bi or none
of such structure-ended sequences.9 Thus the domain of hj is precisely the
structures Bi such that fj is defined on sequences ending with Bi.
This reflects the idea that evolution histories—at least up to the extent
that the agents can see them—must be encoded in the current structure, if
anywhere. The current structure could naturally represent, e.g., the physical
world at the current time instance, and the agents’ behaviour would then be
assumed to depend only on the current physical world. Indeeed, even the
full sequence
(B0,a0, . . . ,Bi−1,ai−1)
can be partially (or even fully, within suitable situations) encoded into the
current world Bi of the extended sequence
(B0,a0, . . . ,Bi−1,ai−1,Bi).
(or body) of the agent encode, e.g., a Turing machine, possibly with some fault tolerance
included. The input to fi need not be encoded anywhere necessarily. But if it is, then
it is most naturally encoded by some small, distinguished part of the current structure,
suitably local to the body. This means that fi does not truly necessarily depend on
the full sequence ending with the current structure. Instead fi depends only on a crude
representation of the actual input. We will discuss these issues in a bit more detail below.
8It is worth noting that interpretations of systems and the related metaphysical issues
do not necessarily have to be taken in some overtly literal sense. Interpretations can also be
flexible frameworks that guide thinking in intuitive and fruitful ways. Moreover, it is worth
remembering that systems also model various frameworks that can appear rather concrete
and even mundane, such as concrete games, simple physical systems, computations, et
cetera. Nevertheless, the more literal interpretation attempts are important as they relate
to quite fundamental issues.
9This is because the outputs of fj are determined by the last structure of each input
sequence. Thus also a possible lack of an output is taken to be so determined.
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Obviously, different agents fj can be made to see (i.e., depend on) different
(typically rather small) parts of that encoding.10
Also F can be made dependent upon the last structure only. This is perhaps
natural when F is interpreted to be the part of the physical nature that is
not dependent upon chance. Then it may be natural that all such past time
events that are considered to affect F , should be readable (and thus encoded
into) the current structure.
In contrast to fj and F , it is typically most natural (but of course optional)
to keep the behaviour of G dependent on full input tuples (which are of type
((B0,a0, . . . ,Bi,ai),W ) for G). This is natural if G is interpreted to be
some kind of a pure luck factor or something similar, a high external force
or so on. Then it can be reasonable that the output of G is not readable
from the concrete current physical world but can be arbitrary, which in this
case means simply dependence upon the full history of structures and choices
(and the set W ).11
3.2 Eliminating features
It is worth noting that for conceptual reasons, it is nice to have both F
and G in systems, although the combined action of F and G is essentially
a single partial function. We could define systems differently, of course. It
is also worth noting that history features can often be relatively naturally
simulated in current structures by using suitable encodings. This bears a
resemblance to, e.g., defining tree unravelings in temporal logic, where each
node then fully determines the history of that node.
Furthermore, we can make some of the functions F , G and fj concrete (or
perhaps physical) in the sense that some or all of their features get encoded in
the structures Bi. Indeed, we already mentioned this possibility in relation
to agent functions. For example, we can indeed encode Turing machines into
the structures in system domains. The Turing machines are then required
to fully indicate how the concretized functions would operate.
10Naturally agents can also have a limited picture of the current world Bi. This issue
will be discussed more later on below.
11 The article [13] defines systems according to the intuition that indeed only G depends
on full sequences. We note here that there is an obvious typo in [13]. There we should
have
1. ai = (fj(Bi))j∈I
2. Bi+1 = G
(
(B0,a0, . . . ,Bi, ai)
)
,
while the typo version has the first line ai = (fi(Bi))i∈I , which is obviously wrong.
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Let (S,F,G, (fi)i∈I) be a system and h ∈ {fi}i∈I a concretized function.
Suppose that each structure in S encodes h using some distinguished relation
symbols Rh,j. For simplicity, suppose h always depends only on the current
structure instead of the full history. Now, the relations Rh,j are required to
“output” the same choices in each sequence ending with B as what h would
output with the input B. Of course it is natural to make h depend only
on some small part of B, a part that could be encoded close to where the
relations Rh,j have tuples. Closeness here can be measured in relation to
some binary distance relation R. This makes the facts Rh,j(b1, . . . , bl) (here
b1, . . . , bl are elements of B) correspond to the material body of the agent h.
Note that while we assumed h depends only on current structures, we could
encode history features into structures for h to see.
Suppose we encode a concretized agent function h into the model domains,
and suppose we also somehow encode the body of the related agent. It is
then natural (but of course not necessary) to let the body of the related
agent contain the tuples encoding h. It is also natural (but not necessary)
to make the body local, as discussed above. When considering encodings, it
is worth noting that tuples of relations (in standard first-order models) do
not have a clear identity that carries from a model to another. Indeed, if we
have a relation with two tuples, and the model changes so that in the new
model we again have two tuples but now somewhere else in the model, then
there is no obvious way of telling which new tuple corresponds to which old
tuple—if there is any intended correspondence in the first place. If we wish to
encode identities for tuples (in first-order models), one idea is to use ternary
relations to encode binary relations, with the first coordinate providing an
indentity for the tuple. For example, a fact R(b1, b2, b3) would correspond
to a tuple encoding the pair (b2, b3) and having b1 as its indentity.
As we have noted, perceiving only a part of the current model is natural for
agents, and it is natural if the perceived part is in the vicinity of the material
body of the agent. Next we discuss issues related to perception, and beyond.
3.3 Partial and false information
Generally agents make their choices based on sequences
(B0,a0, . . . ,Bk−1,ak−1,Bk).
In other words, the functions fj are functions of such sequences. The setting
where all agents fj depend on the current structure Bk only (i.e., the last
structure of the input sequence) will be below referred to as the positional
scenario. The general setting is refferred to as the general scenario.
In the general scenario, it is natural that agents fj do not use the full sequence
(B0,a0, . . . ,Bk−1,ak−1,Bk)
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leading to the current structure Bk, but instead some representation of that
full sequence. Similarly, in the positional scenarion, it is natural to assume
that the agents only see some representation of Bk.
In both scenarios, the representation may not necessarily resemble the rep-
resented sequence/structure at all, but could instead be partially or even
wholly different. The intuition of the representation is that it is the mental
model the agent has about reality. Let us make this precise.
We first consider the positional scenario. Fix a system (S,F,G, (fi)i∈I).
While the functions fi can indeed depend on all of the current model Bk,
which can be quite reasonable when modeling perfect information games, it
is highly natural to define perception functions to cover the scenario of partial
and even false information. Perception functions will make the agent func-
tions fi depend upon perceived models or mental models. We let a perception
function for agent i to be a map pi : S → Si, where Si is a class of structures
whose signature may be different from those in S. The class Si is the class of
mental models of agent i. We then dictate that fi(B) = di(pi(B)) for each
input B ∈ S, where di : Si → A is called the decision function of agent i,
and A is simply the set of actions of the system we are considering.
For a concrete example, pi could be a first-order reduction, more or less in
the sense of model theory or descriptive complexity, giving a very crude,
finite approximation of the original model (which is the input to pi).
12 Now,
even if the input model to pi is infinite, the output model can be finite and
depend only on some small part of the input model.13 Note that parts of
the agents’ epistemic states can be encoded into the original models in S.
Thus the agents can try to take into account those parts of the other agents’
epistemic states that they believe to have access to. How much agent i knows
about the other agents’ epistemic states in B ∈ S will be reflected in the
structure of the mental model pi(B).
14 But of course this information can
be highly partial, even false, and obviously each agent tends to see different
12Here the output of pi approximates the current model. We note that it is often sensible
to let each output of pi be intended to approximate the current instance (B, E), or even
more, with nested beliefs, intentions of agents, and so on.
13That part could indeed quite naturally be mostly in the vicinity of the encoded body
of the agent.
14The mental model can reflect the agent’s beliefs about the other agents’ mental states,
and the agent’s beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, and so on, possibly in a way that includes
all agent-mixed nested modalities. But, of course, a mental model does not have to try
to do too much. Concerning modalites about nested beliefs, it is typically unrealistic to
have everything in the mental model. Indeed, concerning information in general, it is very
much realistic to have somehow strongly partial (and perhaps false) information in the
mental model. This relates directly to, e.g., limited memory capacities as well as limited
perception.
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parts of information of the other agents’ epistemic states. Of course agents
do not even have to know the full set of agents operating in the framework.
The case in the general scenario is very similar and analogous to the posi-
tional scenario. Many conceptual issues are more or less the same to a large
extent. The difference in the formalism is that now pi maps from the set of
structure-ended sequences of the original system into the set Si of mental
models of the agent i. The mental model can, in both the general and po-
sitional setting, encode how much the agent i remembers and understands
about the sequence that has lead to the current model in S. In the general
scenario, however, the mental model that pi outputs indeed formally depends
on full input sequences, while in the positional scenario, the sequence leading
to the current model is available only to the (possibly nonexisting) extent
that the sequence is encoded in the current model.
Different agents i can of course have different sets Si. But, in general, what
should the mental models in the sets Si look like? One option is that they
encode sets of models in S. Such a set corresponds to the models in S
that the agent considers possible.15 This is a very classical approach. It is
completely unrealistic in many scenarios, as the agent would simply have
too much information. Furthermore, it requires that all the models that the
agent consider possible are actually models in S.
A somewhat more realistic scenario goes as follows. A mental model in Si
is simply a set A of axioms in some logic. Intuitively, it axiomatizes what
the actual current model (and the history leading to it) should look like. It
can also describe what the full global system (including possible futures, the
other agents and their mental models, the location of the current model, et
cetera) looks like.16 We here concentrate mainly on how well the current
model is known. The set A could now contain the following.
1. A set F of facts.17 These are atoms R(b1, . . . , bk). The elements
b1, . . . , bk are taken from some set B
′ (which does not have to be the do-
main of any model in S). Intuitively, the agent could regard b1, . . . , bk
to be domain elements of the actual current model (which formally is
the model B such that pi(B) = A). The relation symbol R can intu-
itively belong to the signature of the models in Si. Thus R(b1, . . . , bk)
could be for example the fact TallerThan(John, Jack) representing
15A related possibility would be to let a mental model encode a full set of instances
(B, E) the agent considers possible.
16The picture of reality is indeed typically highly partial.
17We note that facts do not have to be true in any sense. Perhaps atoms would be a
better term, or assumptions.
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the agent’s belief that John is taller than Jack in the current actual
model18 B.
The relation R can be something the agent considers to somehow be
an actual relation in B, but R can also be some relation internal to
the thinking of the agent. In that case also the elements b1, . . . , bk can
perhaps represent something that the agent does not consider belong-
ing to B. Indeed, such a virtual or purely mental category of facts can
be very important. It could be desirable to include, e.g., beliefs about
other agents’ beliefs into mental models. This will involve encoding
related issues into facts in F .
2. A set F ′ of negative facts. These are fully analogous to facts in F ,
but represent beliefs that the agent thinks false. Formally, these are
literals ¬R(b1, . . . , bk), where R(b1, . . . , bk) is as described above. Note
that there is no problem if the agent holds a fact in F and its negation
in F ′. Then the agent simply has contradictory beliefs. It may be
difficult for the agent to detect the contradiction.
3. A set B of other axioms.19 These are, in the most obvious cases, state-
ments that the agent thinks the actual current model satisfies. They
could also be statements about more abstract issues that are not (nec-
essarily) directly related to the current model, for example statements
about the beliefs of other agents. The only difference between these
and the facts and negative facts in F∪F ′ is that these need not be liter-
als. These non-literals can still, of course, make use of the elements in
B′, if desired. Again the agent can have contradictory beliefs, as some
subset of B can have a contradiction as a logical consequence. It could
simply be difficult for the agent to deduce that contradiction. Or even,
it is possible that the agent later on does easily deduce that contradic-
tion, but at this stage of evolution, the agent has not yet been able to
obtain the contradiction. Such a situation occurs even in mathematical
proofs; we typically do not immediately obtain a contradiction, but it
takes some effort.
To give an example of the above scenario, let the system domain S consist of
first-order models. Let the set B′ be the union of the domains of the models
18
Jack and John are both elements of B′ (but need not really be anything in B,
although it is natural if they are). It is worth noting that generally the elements in B′
can be differentiated—if desired—from the possible constant symbols in the signature
of mental models. For example, one may wish to keep the elements in B′ identical to
supposed actual elements, while constant symbols are simply names of supposed actual
elements. We note that Jack and John here are not meant to be agents (although they
could possibly be). Instead, they are simply what the agent i considers to be elements of
B.
19Not to be confused with the set B of an instance (B, E).
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in S. Suppose the current model B ∈ S consists of a domain {a, b} and a
relation R = {(a, a), (a, b)}. Let the mental model pi(B) be given by
F = {R(a, a)}, F ′ = {¬R(b, a)}, and B = {¬∃≥8x(x = x)}.
We are here discussing a scenario where the mental model simply tries to
identify B to the best possible extent. The agent knows that R(a, a) and
¬R(b, a) as well as ¬∃≥8x(x = x) hold, but the agent has no idea about
whether—for example—the fact R(b, b) holds or whether there are more than
two elements. The agent knows, we suppose in this scenario, that the actual
model is one of the models in the set of {R}-models that satisfy F ∪F ′ ∪ B
and have domain D such that {a, b} ⊆ D ⊆ B′.20 Thus the setting resembles
open world querying. Now, to fully know the model B, the mental model
could be given by
F = {R(a, a), R(a, b)}, F ′ = { ¬R(b, a),¬R(b, b) }
and B = {∃=2x(x = x)}.
Note that here we give the full relational diagram of B and specify that there
are no more elements than those mentioned in the diagram. This suffices to
fully specify the model in this case.21
Now, the agent i must choose an action based on the mental model pi(B).
This is done via a function di : Si → A that maps mental models to actions in
A. Now, a typical agent has limited reasoning resources, not being logically
omniscient. Indeed, as we have discussed, it could even in some cases be
difficult for the agent to deduce a contradiction from a fact in F and its
negation in F ′. This is even typical if F and F ′ are large (physical) look-up
tables. And deducing a contradiction from a contradictory set B is likewise
not always straightforward.
One natural way to model di is to use the limited reasoning capacities de-
scribed in [11]. The idea is that the agent uses logical reasoning, but has
20If M is an {R}-model and has a and b as domain elements, then we define that
M |= F ∪ F ′ ∪ B if the expansion N of M with constant symbols a and b (interpreted
such that aN = a and bN = b) satisfies all formulae in F ∪ F ′ ∪ B. (Note that ¬R(a, b)
already implies that there must be two elements at least (a and b are different elements),
and note indeed that we do not even interpret these formulae on models without a and b
in the domain. Of course one could avoid all this, if desired, and work only with the usual
conventions concerning constant symbols.)
21Here we did not include atoms a = a in the diagram, but of course one would generally
have to include them to always be able to tell what the domain is when looking at the
full diagram. When diagrams indeed mean sets of literals where the constants in the
literals are domain elements, we can specify models fully with suitable diagram notions,
not only up to isomorphism, if we so wish for one reason or another. But there is nothing
technically deep behind this, and different conventions are possible for different ways of
modeling.
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access only to a possibly too small collection of inference rules and may also
have to truncate reasoning patterns after quite short reasoning chains. The
premises consist of the set F ∪ F ′ ∪ B. It is natural for example to impose
a fixed limit n dictating how many times the agent is allowed to use the
inference rules. Also, it is natural to put similar limitations onto the set of
formulae the agent can know at any time. So, if the agent reasons starting
from F ∪F ′∪B, the agent cannot add new formulae into the setting without
a limit when reasoning. The agent may have to throw some formulae away
during the reasoning process. While this mainly models finite memory ca-
pacities, note, however, that of course the agent could use external look-up
tables to store information. But those could, on the other hand, become
large and slow to read. Anyway, in an ideal case, the agent can deduce the
full structure of the current model B based on the mental model, and per-
haps even the full history leading to B, and beyond, all the way to the global
features of the system. If the agent i can always deduce the full history, then
fi can depend on full histories.
It is obviously dependent upon the agent (and even the current instance)
what reasoning tools can be used, and how complex reasoning patterns are
allowed. Concerning reasoning tools, it is reasonable to add inference rules
to the set F ∪ F ′ ∪ B. An additional set I could be used. There should
be ways to modify the set I based on the current world and the history.
Such ways can be encoded into the function pi that produces the mental
models. A later mental model is typically dependent upon an earlier one,
e.g., pi(Bj+1) upon and pi(Bj); this dependence could be mediated via the
actual world Bj+1.
Of course one does not have to use standard logic to model truncated and
limited reasoning, but also, e.g., complexity classes and computation devices
with suitably limited capacities. The mental models above are a starting
point, but of course one would like to add more general features to the
picture. For example, probabilistic and fuzzy features (e.g., probabilistic
weights on the literals and even general axioms) are surely interesting. And
obviously probability theory is not likely to suffice, but generalizations are
needed. Other approaches that also immediately suggest themselves include
using neural networks and other frameworks that involve possibilities for
heuristic reasoning. The obvious places where to use neural networks concern
the perception and decision functions pi and di. A neural network device
would be a natural option for producing the outputs of pi. It would look at
some small part of the current model (and perhaps its history) and operate
based on that. Also di could quite naturally be computed, based the mental
model, via a neural network device. We could even remove the mental model
from between pi and di altogether, if desired. However, concerning human
agents, it would ultimately perhaps be more informative to combine the use
16
of neural networks with more classical features.
It is worth noting that in our concrete example of a mental model, the set
F ∪F ′ approximated a first-order model. But human agents more typically
entertain picture-like representations of models, that is, drawings of struc-
tures rather than the structures themselves. It can be difficult to detect, e.g.,
graph isomorphism. To account for more geometric mental models, we could
modify the F ∪F ′ ∪B approach a bit. The idea is to add three-dimensional
grids to the setting. Let G1, . . . , Gℓ be such grids.
22 We let each grid have a
finite (but perhaps large) domain and thus correspond to a finite set of points
forming a rectangular cuboid array. Now, we identify each (or alternatively,
some) of the elements b ∈ B′ appearing in the literals of F ∪ F ′ with some
grid point. If there are elements in the formulae of B that do not occur in
the literals, then those elements can also be identified with grid points. It is
natural (but not necessary) to require that each literal has its elements in a
single grid. Now the patterns described via F ∪ F ′ have become geometric
objects (we draw the tuples into the grids in the obvious way). We have
drawings in three dimensions (and these could be made two dimensional as
well). The reason we have started with several rather than a single grid is
that typically an agent entertains a collection of mental images rather than
a single one.
It is interesting to note that while F ∪ F ′ corresponds to knowledge, B in
some sense relates to understanding, or at least more abstract knowledge. We
could add a set C to F∪F ′∪B, this being a set of suitably encoded reasoning
algorithms that the agent could then use on the formulae in F ∪F ′ ∪B and
their more or less immediate logical consequences. C could contain at least
some proof rules (as the set I discussed above did). Now C would relate quite
nicely to understanding and the look-up-table-like set F ∪F ′ to knowledge.
Of course somehow truncated reasoning, not full logical consequence, would
be natural. Indeed, full logical consequence seems to relate to potential
knowability rather than knowledge.
Summarizing this section so far, we have identified ways to model partial
information and even false information via mental models given by pi. A
partially false and strongly incomplete picture is a reasonably natural start-
ing point for modeling attempts. We have also discussed how di could take
into account limitations in reasoning capacities. There are many ways to do
this, and obviously a huge range of issues to investigate.
So far we have concentrated on the positional scenario. In the general sce-
nario, however, the functions pi and di are very much conceptually analogous
22These are models with three binary relations, H indicating the left-to-right neighbour
relation, V indicating the down-to-up neighbour relation, and D indicating the closer-to-
the-viewer relation. The relations are analogous to 3D coordinate axis orientations.
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to their counterparts in the positional scenario, so the above investigations
also largely apply conceptually in the general setting. Formally, the domain
of pi is the set of structure-ended (S,A, I)-sequences and the output is a
mental model. It is perhaps most natural to make the domain of di simply
the set of mental models, as in the positional scenario. Indeed, even in the
positional scenario, some parts of histories would often become encoded in
the mental models, as there can be history features encoded in a current
structure. However, it can also be reasonable to, e.g., let di depend on the
chain of mental models leading to the current one, and the agent’s own action
in every past iteration step.
3.4 Further issues
Systems can be used to model games, computation and physics systems, to
name a few possibilities. Indeed, all kinds of interactive scenarios are rea-
sonably naturally modeled by systems. Concerning applications in physics
systems, the advantage of our formal systems is the possibility of concretely
modeling supposed mental entities (agents and G) together with the suppos-
ably physical part (structures and F ).23
Cellular automata provide a starting point for digital physics, but systems,
as defined above, are much more flexible.24 The metaphysical setting of
systems provides a lot of explanatory power for understanding phenomena.25
The way the supposedly mental constructs (G and each fi) interact with the
material parts is highly interesting. As systems are fully formal, concrete
modeling attempts will force new concepts and insights to emerge.
One of the most concrete and obvious advantages of systems when compared
to, e.g., standard cellular automata, is that it is not necessary to keep agents
(and other entities) local. Furthermore, it is not necessary (although can
be natural) to keep agents and other entities computable. However, com-
putability and semi-computatbility are obviously very important issues. As
23We note that the division “agents and G” vs “structures and F ” does not necessar-
ily provide a strict gap between what would be conceived as mental and what physical.
Indeed, of course the supposed mental and physical realms are likely to show some con-
nection between them to enable interaction between the realms. The agents realistically
have perception functions pi via which they see the structures in the system domain. And
the function F looks at the actions of the agents and provides an output partially based
on that. However, we coud assert, e.g., that F only sees the actions once they have been
performed, making F fully material in some sense.
24Of course one of the most obvious ideas is to make functions computable or semi-
computable. But it is interesting to keep also more general functions in the picture, for
example it could be quite natural to let G be uncomputable. And it is often natural to
let F output infinite sets.
25Indeed, it is natural to regard systems as a framework providing a formal metaphys-
ical setting for modeling seemingly less fundamental frameworks with more contingent
properties, such as particular physical processes, for instance.
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suggested in [9], extensions of the Turing-complete logic L can be naturally
used as logics to guide systems. We will discuss this issue below in Section
4.
3.5 More general systems
Our notion of a system can of course be generalized. Indeed, currently every
current structure has a finite history leading to it. To allow for infinite past
evolutions, and to get rid of the discreteness of the steps between subsequent
models, we define the following notion.
A total g-system (g for general26) is defined to be a tuple
(S, (Rj)j∈J , F, (fi)i∈I , G)
such that the following conditions hold.
1. S is a set of structures.
2. Each Rj ⊆ S
kj is a kj-ary relation over S. Intuitively, Rj could for
example give a partial order of the structures in S that corresponds to
time. But of course other interpretations are possible.
3. F is a function P(S) × AI → P(P(S)). Intuitively, F maps each
history (a set of structures in S) to a set of extended evolutions (a
collection of subsets of S). The output depends also on the actions of
the agents.
4. Each fi is a function P(S) → A from histories to actions.
5. G is a function P(S) × AI → P(S) such that G(t) ∈ F (t) for each
input where F (t) 6= ∅. If F (t) = ∅, then G(t) = ∅. Intuitively, G just
picks the actual outcome from the set of possible outcomes given by
F .27
This is a relatively general approach. For example, it is possible to cover
cyclic approaches to time, even dense ones, for example by mapping S into
R
2. And of course one can consider approaches with no time concept in the
first place.
A basic notion in total g-systems is a set of structures. The principal intuition
of such a set is a history of some kind. Note that histories do not this time
contain actions, so single action tuples in AI are perhaps most naturally
26A g-system is defined to be a system that can be obtained from a total g-system by
allowing some of the involved functions to be partial.
27We could of course combine the actions of F andG and thereby only have one function,
but it is nice and natural to include both of them.
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continuous processes acting all the way through the input (a history). But
of course actions could be embedded into histories in a different way, leading
to generalizations. Another one of the reasonable further generalizations is
to base actions on sets of histories instead of a single one. This leads to
systems (P(S), (Rj)j∈J , F, (fi)i∈I , G) with the following specification.
28
1. S is a set of structures.
2. Each Rj ⊆ S
kj is still simply a kj-ary relation over S.
3. F is a function P(P(S)) ×AI → P(P(P(S))).
4. Each fi is a function P(P(S)) → A.
5. G is a function P(P(S)) ×AI → P(P(S)) such that G(t) ∈ F (t) for
each input where F (t) 6= ∅. If F (t) = ∅, then G(t) = ∅.
Further generalizations would involve, e.g., putting weights on structure sets
and sets of structure sets. And so on and so on.
A highly general setting to model nested beliefs can be based on the concur-
rent game models of Alternating-time temporal logic. Consider the reason-
ably flexible concurrent game models as defined in, inter alia, [4]. These can
be given canonical tree unravelings; we begin from a single state and unravel
from there. This gives an unraveled model with a root. We let T be a set
of such unravelings. One of the unravelings could be what is actually hap-
pening, but we will also model (possibly false and even unrealizable) beliefs
about time flow.
Now, each state of T has a unique history. (Recall that a state is now a copy
of a state in some original model, but also with a unique history.) Given
the set of agents is K, suppose there is, for each k ∈ K, a binary relation
Rk ⊆ Q × Q, where Q is the set of states of T . Intuitively, (q1, q2) ∈ Rk
if in the state q1, the agent k considers it possible that (s)he is currently
in state q2. So these are epistemic relations, and they can point from one
unraveling to another. The nice thing here is that the states have a unique
history, so the binary relations are also binary epistemic relations over the
set of histories. And each history has a sequence of changing beliefs about
the current history, et cetera.
Now we can analyse interesting nested beliefs that also involve temporal
statemens. Suppose k is at qa and Rk points only to qb from qa. Now k
believes to be at qb. Suppose the predecessor of qb is qc. Now k thinks the
28 The specification is close to simply replacing S in the previous specification by P(S),
but not exactly the same.
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previous state was qc. Now suppose qc is also the predecessor of qa. Then k
is right about the previous state but for a wrong reason.29
Here we did not nest the beliefs of different agents, k and l for example. But
that is of course possible, leading to beliefs about beliefs with a temporal
dimension, and so on and so on. All this is nice and quite general. The
mental model of k at q could be considered to be the set of pairs (T , q′)
such that (q, q′) ∈ Rk.
30 However, in the current article we are very much
interested in using (what would be) the internal structure of states. In T , the
states do not have an internal structure.31 The setting of T uses epistemic
relations that in a sense seem blind to the possible internal structures of
states. Nevertheless, both the internal view and the external one can be
useful, and surely the approaches can be combined. Indeed, states of T
might as well be (replaced by) relational structures, and conversely, our
structure-based setting with systems and mental models does suggest global
epistemic relations for agents.
In T and also generally in Kripke models, it is interesting to define a meta-
physical (rather than epistemic) relation Sk for agents k. As Rk, this is also a
binary relation on states of T (or some other Kripke model). Now, using the
relations Sk and Rk, it is at least relatively natural to define the standard
indicative implication “ϕ implies ψ” as [Rk](ϕ → ψ) and the subjunctive
implication “if ϕ was the case, then so would ψ” as [Sk](ϕ → ψ). Here [Rk]
and [Sk] are boxes with the accessibility relations Rk and Sk, and ϕ and ψ
are formulae whose truth sets are sets of states. The metaphysical modal-
ities Sk are likely to be similar or even the same for all agents. Typically
they would be equivalence relations, but not necessarily always. Finally, it
is worth noting that two states can naturally be coupled with an indistin-
guishability relation of agent k if k sees precisely the same states from the
two states via the epistemic relation Rk.
4 Systems and logic
The article [7] defines a natural Turing-complete extension L of first-order
logic FO. This new logic is Turing-complete in the sense that it can define
29All kinds of questions rise about the setting, the epistemic relations, and so on. For
example, one would typically—but perhaps not always—require the epistemic relations to
be transitive. But, we shall not discuss this setting in depth here.
30If we want to remember the original models that gave rise to the unravelings, we get
an interesting static-sameness relation over the set of states of T defined such that q and
q′ are related if the last state in q and q′ is the same state (and originates from the same
model). Note that q and q′ are indeed sequences formally.
31They have no internal structure unless we look into the sequences (in the original
models) that define the states in T when we unravel models. But we do not mean to look
into them here (with the exception of defining the static-sameness relations).
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precisely all recursively enumerable classes of finite structures. The logic
is based on adding two new capacities to FO. The first one of these is
the capacity to modify models. The logic can add new points to models
and new tuples to relations, and dually, the logic can delete domain points
and tuples from relations.32 The second new capacity is the possibility of
formulae to refer to themselves. The self-referentiality operator of L is based
on a construct that enables looping when formulae are evaluated using game-
theoretic semantics.33
The reason the logic L is particularly interesting lies in its simplicity and
its exact behavioural correspondence with Turing machines. Furthermore, it
provides a natural and particularly simple unified perspective on logic and
computation. Also, the new operators of L directly capture two fundamen-
tal classes of constructors—missing from FO—that are used all the time in
everyday mathematics:
1. fresh points are added to constructions and fresh lines are drawn, et
cetera, in various contexts in, e.g., geometry, and
2. recursive operators are omnipresent in mathematical practice, often
indicated using the three dots (...).
One of the advantageous properties of L (in relation to typical logics) is that
it can indeed modify models. And models surely do not have be static, al-
thought that is still the typical approach. Even in classical mathematics, we
modify our structures. For example in compass-and-straightedge construc-
tions, we draw new points and lines. While there exist logics that modify
structures (e.g., sabotage modal logic, some public announcement logics, et
cetera), L offers a fundamental framework for modifications.
32Strictly speaking, the system defined in [7] did not include the capacity to delete points
from model domains. However, this possibility was briefly discussed, and it was then ruled
out only due to page limitations in the paper. The reason for leaving out the capacity to
delete domain points was mainly related to the fact that this can lead to variables x whose
referent has gone missing from the model domain. Also empty models appear. However,
in the current article we let L refer to the logic that also has the domain element deletion
operator (and the empty model is fine). Furthermore, [7] made the some other limitations
to the syntax of L so that a semantic game does not lead to anomalous situations where
again x has no value (even if there are no domain element deletions). Such situations were
described to result in from non-standard jumps. Here we impose no limitations on the
syntax. Basically the result of these relaxations is simply more situations where neither
player has a winning strategy in the game. Also, domain element deletion is crucial in
various scenarios that allow all computable model transformations to be modeled directly.
33See [7] for sufficient details on game-theoretic semantics, and see [5], [15] for some
early ideas leading to the notion of game-theoretic semantics.
22
4.1 The syntax and semantics of L
Here we give the syntax and semantics of L. For the full formal details, see
[7]. We let L denote the language that extends the syntax specification of
first-order logic by the following formula construction rules:
1. ϕ 7→ Ixϕ
2. ϕ 7→ IR(x1,...,xn) ϕ
3. ϕ 7→ Dxϕ
4. ϕ 7→ DR(x1,...,xn) ϕ
5. Ci is an atomic formula (for each i ∈ N)
6. ϕ 7→ Ci ϕ
7. We also allow allow atoms X(x1, . . . , xk) where X ∈ tsymb is a k-
ary relation symbol not in the signature considered. The set tsymb
contains a countably infinite set of symbols for each positive integer
arity.34
Intuitively, a formula of type Ixϕ(x) states that it is possible to insert a fresh,
isolated element u to the domain of the current model so that the resulting
new model satisfies ϕ(u). The fresh element u being isolated means that u
is disconnected from the original model; the relations of the original model
are not altered in any way by the operator Ix, so u does not become part
of any relational tuple at the moment of insertion. (Note that we assume a
purely relational signature for the sake of simplicity.)
A formula of type IR(x1,...,xn) ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) states that it is possible to insert
a tuple (u1, . . . , un) to the relation R so that ϕ(u1, . . . , un) holds in the
obtained model. The tuple (u1, . . . , un) is a sequence of elements in the
original model, so this time the domain of the model is not altered. Instead,
the n-ary relation R obtains a new tuple. The deletion operators Dx and
DR(x1,...,xn) have obvious dual intuitions to the insertion operators.
The new atomic formulae Ci can be regarded as variables ranging over for-
mulae, so a formula Ci can be considered to be a pointer to (or the name
of) some other formula. The formulae Ci ϕ could intuitively be given the
34The name tsymb comes from the fact that these symbols are analogous to Turing
machine tape symbols, i.e., symbols not part of the input language. It is conjectured in
[7] that the symbols in tsymb are not needed for Turing-completeness of L, unless the
background signature contains no symbols of arity at least two. The R in the operators
IR(x1,...xn) and DR(x1,...xn) can be a relation symbol in the signature or a symbol in tsymb.
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following reading: the claim Ci, which states that ϕ, holds. Thus the for-
mula Ci ϕ is both naming ϕ to be called Ci and claming that ϕ holds.
35
Importantly, the formula ϕ can contain Ci as an atomic formula. This leads
to self-reference. For example, the liar’s paradox now corresponds to the
formula Ci ¬Ci. .
The logic L is based on game-theoretic semantics GTS which directly extends
the standard GTS of FO. Recall that the GTS of FO is based on games
played by the verifier and falsifier, or more accurately, between Eloise and
Abelard, Eloise first holding the verifying role (which can change if a negation
is encountered). In a game for checking if M |= ϕ, Eloise is trying to show
(or verify) that indeed M |= ϕ and Abelard is opposing this, i.e., Abelard
wishes to falsify the claim M |= ϕ. The players start from the original
formula and work their way towards subformulae and ultimately atoms. See
[7] for further details concerning the GTS of FO and also L.
We now discuss how the rules for the FO-game are extended to deal with L.
Further details are indeed given in [7]. Each game position involves a model
-assignment pair (M, f) and a formula ψ. The point of the assignment f is to
give interpretations to the free variable symbols of ψ in the domain of M. A
game position also specifies which one of Eloise and Abelard is the verifying
player. Furthermore, there is an assignment that gives interpretations of the
relations X not in the signature. In the beginning of the game play, the
relations X are all empty relations, so they must be built by adding tuples
during the game play. For simplicity, we do not explicitly write down this
assignment for relations X below, but instead assume it is somehow encoded
into the models involved.36 The game rules go as follows.
1. In a position involving (M, f) and the formula Ixψ(x), the game is
continued from a position with (M′, f [x 7→ u]) and ψ(x), where M′ is
the model obtained by simply inserting a fresh isolated point u to the
domain of M. The fresh point is named x.
35It is worth noting that the approach in L to formulae Ci ϕ bears some degree of
purely technical similarity to evaluations of fixed-point operators of the µ-calculus via
game-theoretic semantics. However, that approach to fixed-point operators has not—to
the author’s knowledge—been connected to self-referentiality and the related concepts in
any way. Indeed, the approach of L is—to the author’s knowledge—conceptually novel,
and has game-theoretic semantics as an underlying primitive starting point. Furthermore,
the approach in L is fully general and not explicitly related to any fixed-point concepts.
For example, there are no monotonicity restrictions imposed on formulae, unlike in the
µ-calculus for example. Another thing worth noting here is that [7] simply uses numbers
as formula variables (which here are symbols Ci).
36For example, we could assume that each X in the formula we are evaluating is in-
terpreted in the model we are investigating, being originally interpreted as the empty
relation. But despite that, the relations X are not considered part of the official signature
of the model.
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2. In a position with (M, f) and IR(x1,...,xn)ψ(x1, . . . , xn), the verifier
chooses a tuple (u1, . . . , un) of elements in M and the game is con-
tinued from the position with (M′, f [x1 7→ u1, . . . , xn 7→ un]) and
ψ(x1, . . . , xn) where M
′ is obtained from M by inserting the tuple
(u1, . . . , un) to the relation R. Note that R can be part of the signa-
ture or one of the relations X outside the signature.
3. Consider a position involving (M, f) and the formula Dxψ. Now the
game is continued from a position with (M′, f \ {(z, u) | z ∈ VAR})
and ψ, where M′ is the model obtained by deleting the point u such
that f(x) = u from M (and VAR is the set of all first-order variable
symbols). If no such point u exists, i.e., if f does not have x in the
function domain, then nothing is done. Note that the assignment func-
tion f \ {(z, u) | z ∈ VAR} is of course obtained from f by removing
the pairs of type (z, u) where z is a variable. Thus, in particular, the
pair (x, u) is removed.
4. In a position with (M, f) and DR(x1,...,xn)ψ(x1, . . . , xn), the verifier
chooses a tuple (u1, . . . , un) of elements in M and the game is con-
tinued from the position with (M′, f [x1 7→ u1, . . . , xn 7→ un]) and
ψ(x1, . . . , xn) where M
′ is obtained from M by deleting the tuple
(u1, . . . , un) from the relation R. If there is no such tuple in R, then
the relation stays as it is. As above, we note that R can be in the
signature or one of the relations X outside the signature.
5. In a position involving (M, f) and Ci ψ, we simply move to the position
involving (M, f) and ψ.
6. In an atomic position involving (M, f) and Ci, the game moves to the
position (M, Ci ψ). Here Ci ψ is a subformula of the original formula
that the semantic game began with. If there are many such subfor-
mulae Ci ψ, the verifying player can freely jump to any of them. If
there are no such formulae, the game play ends with neither player
winning.37
7. In a position with (M, f) and an atom of type R(x1, . . . , xn) or x = y,
the game play ends. We denote the atom by ψ and note that R can
once again be in the signature or one of the symbols X. The verifier
wins if (M, f) |= ψ, where |= is the semantic turnstile of standard FO.
The falsifier wins if (M, f) |= ¬ψ. If ψ contains any variables that are
not in the domain of f , then neither player wins.
37An alternative convention would be to jump to the immediately superordinate formula
Ci ψ in the cases where there are many choices. If no such immediately superordinate
choice was available, the game play would end with neither player winning.
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8. The positions involving ∃, ∧, ¬ are dealt with exactly as in standard
first-order logic.
Just like the FO-game, the extended game ends only if an atomic position
with an atom R(x1, . . . , xn) or x = y is encountered.
38 Here R can be in the
signature or one of the relations X. The winner is then decided precisely as
in the FO-game. That is, the verifying player wins if the pair (M, f) in that
position satisfies the formula involved, and the falsifying player wins if (M, f)
satisfies the negation of the formula. In the anomalous unintended cases
where f does not interpret all of the variables in the formula R(x1, . . . , xn)
or x = y of the position, neither player wins the play of the game.
Since the play of the game can end only if an atom R(x1, . . . , xn) or x = y is
encountered, the game play can go on forever, as for example the games for
CiCi and Ci ¬Ci demonstrate. If a play indeed goes on forever, then that
play is won by neither of the players.
Turing-machines exhibit precisely the kind of behaviour captured by L, as
they can
1. halt in an accepting state (corresponding to Eloise—who is initially the
verifier—winning the semantic game play),
2. halt in a rejecting state (corresponding to Abelard—who is the initial
falsifier—winning),
3. diverge (corresponding to neither of the players winning).
Indeed, there is a precise correspondence between L and Turing machines.
Let M |=+ ϕ (respectively, M |=− ϕ) denote that Eloise (respectively,
Abelard) has a winning strategy in the game beginning with M and ϕ.
Let enc(M) denote the encoding of the finite model M according to some
standard encoding scheme.39 Then the following theorem shows that L cor-
responds to Turing machines so that not only acceptance and rejection but
even divergence of Turing computation is captured in a precise and natural
way. The proof follows from [7]. In the theorem, by a Turing machine for a
structure problem, we mean a Turing machine TM that gives an equivalent
treatment to isomorphic inputs: for isomorphic M and N, TM either accepts
both enc(M) and enc(N); rejects both; or diverges on both inputs.
38Well, now the game can end also if Ci refers to no formula Ciψ, but this is anomalous.
39The domain of a finite model can be assumed to be a subset of N, so an implicit
natural linear ordering is readily available for obtaining the encoding.
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Theorem 4.1. For every Turing machine TM for a structure problem, there
exists a formula ϕ ∈ L such that
1. TM accepts enc(M) iff M |=+ ϕ,
2. TM rejects enc(M) iff M |=− ϕ.
Vice versa, for every ϕ ∈ L, there is a TM such that the above two conditions
hold.
Technically this is a result in descriptive complexity theory showing that L
captures the complexity class RE (recursive enumerability). While the re-
sult concerns finite models, it is possible to extend the result to deal with
arbitrary models. The idea is to extend Turing machines to suitable hyper-
computation models while allowing iteration in L to repeat for ω rounds and
beyond.
Since L captures RE, it cannot be closed under negation. Thus ¬ is not the
classical negation. However, L has a very natural translation into natural
language. The key is to replace truth by verification. We read M |=+ ϕ as
the claim that “it is verifiable that T (ϕ)" where T is the translation from L
into natural language defined below. We give two ways to translate atoms
x = y and R(x1, . . . , xn). The first way (given in clause 1 below) covers the
case where in each game position, every first-order variable must get a value
assigned to it via the assignment function f . Clause 9 gives a more careful
reading for x = y and R(x1, . . . , xn) which covers also the anomalous cases
where f may not give values to all variables.
1. We translate x = y and R(x1, . . . , xn) to themselves, so for example
T (x = y) simply reads x equals y.
2. The atoms Ci are read as they stand, so T (Ci) = Ci.
3. The FO-quantifiers translate in the standard way, so we let T (∃xϕ) =
there exists an x such that T (ϕ) and analogously for ∀x.
4. Also ∨ and ∧ translate in the standard way, so T (ϕ∨ψ) = T (ϕ) or T (ψ)
and analogously for ∧.
5. However, T (¬ψ) = it is falsifiable that T (ψ). Thus negation translates
to the dual of verifiability.
6. Concerning the insertion operators, we let
T (Ixϕ) = it is possible to insert a new element x such that T (ϕ).
Similarly, we let
T (IR(x1,...,xn) ϕ) =
it is possible to insert a tuple (x1, . . . , xn) into R such that T (ϕ).
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7. Deletion operators can also be given similar natural readings.
8. Finally, we let
T (Ci ϕ ) = it is possible to verify the claim Ci which states that T (ϕ).
9. We can always give the following alternative and more careful readings
to first-order atoms x = y and R(x1, . . . , xn):
(a) T (x = y) states that the referent of x is equal to the referent of y.
(b) T (R(x1, . . . , xn)) = the referents of x1, . . . , xn form a tuple in R
in the given order.40
Thereby L can be seen as a simple Turing-complete fragment of natural lan-
guage. Indeed, the simplicity of L is one of its main strengths. Also, as
typical computationally motivated logics translate into L more or less di-
rectly, L can be used as a natural umbrella logic for studying complexities
of logics. This can be advantageous, as the number of different logic for-
malisms is huge. Thus L offers a natural unified framework for a programme
of studying, e.g., validity and satisfiability problems. First-order logic is not
a suitable umbrella logic for such a programme, being expressively too weak.
The expressivity of L, on the other hand, is of a fundamental nature, due
to its Turing-completeness. Furthermore, L offers a top platform for de-
scriptive complexity. Indeed, L can easily capture classes beoynd the class
ELEMENTARY, while no k-th order logic can. Again L would serve as a
natural, unifying umbrella logic.41 All in all, L could be used as a unified
framework for working on—inter alia—many kinds of reasoning issues (va-
lidity, satisfiability) as well as topics relating to expressivity. In the next
section we analyse some further conceptual issues concerning L.
4.2 Further properties of L
It is interesting to note that ¬ can be read as the classical negation (rather
than falsifiability) in those fragments of L where the semantic games are
determined. Standard FO is such a fragment. Furthermore, adding a gener-
alized quantifier to L corresponds to adding a corresponding oracle to Turing
machines; see [7] for further details.
In our system, under our formal and fully explained semantics, the sentence
Ci¬Ci is indeterminate, and so is CiCi. This should be natural from any
40Note that even ending up with an atom x = x (or ¬x = x), without f specifying
a value for x, leads to neither player winning the game. This is natural with the given
reading for atoms. The formulae can indeed quite naturally be considered indeterminate
with respect to verification/falsification when x has no value.
41We note that RE, as a limit of computation, is indeed a reasonable upper bound for
standard descriptive complexity.
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perspective that accepts the semantics we gave. To further analyse whether
this is natural, let us consider Ci Ci first. Now, a typical logic (such as FO)
is compositional, with well-founded formulae. This means each formula is
essentially an algebra term f(t1, . . . , tk). And the formula f(t1, . . . , tk) has
a meaning which is determined by applying the function f to the meanings
of t1, . . . , tk. The well-foundedness means that the algebra term is finite,
and ultimately has atomic formulae x1, . . . , xk whose meaning is fully deter-
mined in some uncontroversial and independent way. Thus we can evaluate
f(t1, . . . , tk) in a finite process, since the ultimately reachable atoms have
already fully defined, independent meanings. Such logical reductionism is
handy indeed.
However, at least in the sense of our semantics, CiCi does not have this
kind of a well-founded evaluation process. Syntactically CiCi is an algebraic
term (the first Ci is an operator and the second one an atom). However,
semantically, the meaning of the atom Ci is not already defined, but instead,
it must be evaluated based on the full formula CiCi (because from the atom
Ci we jump back to the operator Ci and continue checking from there).
Therefore the meaning of CiCi is defined based on CiCi itself. Thus it is
natural to consider the sentence indeterminate. The same holds for Ci¬Ci.
It also tries to define its meaning based on itself. It is indeed natural to
require meanings to be dug from an external source in a reductionist way: if
we define q to be true if and only if q is true, and no further information about
the situation can appear, it is natural to consider q indeterminate. Digging
up the truth value from the atomic level is impossible in the case of CiCi and
Ci¬Ci. We note that, if one accepts the semantic game of Ci¬Ci to also be
the evaluation procedure of the actual liar sentence, then the explained lack
of well-foundedness applies as such. This leads to an indeterminate truth
value. However, of course, this can be considered paradoxical, as now the
statement “this sentence is false” seems false, as the sentence was supposed
to be indeterminate. But false is not indeterminate, and so onwards, in the
usual way, it seems to get different flipping truth values.42
As we have discussed above, our formal systems, as defined in Section 3, can
be used to model a wide variety of dynamical frameworks rather naturally.
Now, it is obvious that the semantic games of the logic L are systems in
our formal sense. Thus L can be directly used, inter alia, to model evolving
42In our system with our reading, Ci¬Ci states roughly that “this sentence is falsifiable.”
The sentence formally evaluates to indeterminate. Now one could assert that since inde-
terminacy does not equal falsifiability, we can conclude that the sentence is in fact false
(meaning that falsifiability was not the case). Now, “false” here meant “falsifiability was
not the case” and indeterminate is therefore consistent with this meaning of false. (Note
that we do not have “false” in our system. Simply falsifiable, verifiable and indeterminate.
We have dictated a semantics, we do not compare truth values to anything external to
the semantics.)
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physical frameworks. However, L is also a natural setting for formalizing
mathematics. Indeed, L can be used as a possible, highly strict measure
of what counts as a mathematical claim. Indeed, mathematics is intuitively
and informally something fully rigorous and somehow predetermined and
objective. It is often considered somehow mind independent and perhaps
even of a Platonic nature. Now, can we capture this intuition of strict
objectivity?
A nice starting point for capturing the intuition would be to assert that
a claim is mathematical if we can determine whether it holds using some
uniform systematic procedure. The idea here is that there exists a systematic
procedure P with a carefully defined set of inputs and the set {yes, no}
of outputs. The (not necessarily nice) requirement here is that the set of
inputs I is somehow rigorously fixed and quite limited. A natural option
here would be that the set I must be somehow extremely simple (for example
the collection of all finite strings over the alphabet {0, 1} or the—suitably
simple and certainly decidable—collection of all formulae of some logic; we
are thinking about L here).
Another (not necessarily nice) requirement is that we must pick a single
systematic procedure P to check, for each input i ∈ I, whether i holds or
not.43 Now, I is precisely the set of mathematical statements, and we have
a systematic and somehow objective procedure P for verifying truth44 of the
statements, but P does not have to produce an output on every input, so
P could correspond to a Turing machine. Thus it is possible to consider
formulae of L to be I. For each input ϕ ∈ L, we check whether ϕ is verified
or falsified in the empty model.45 It is of course possible that ϕ is neither
43A Turing machine is a systematic procedure. Sometimes Turing machines are de-
scribed to capture what can be mechanically executed. But “mechanical” is perhaps not
as good a word as “systematic.” This is because the word “mechanical” has a quite strong
connotation relating to physicality. Physical systems can do things that seem more or less
impossible to explain/calculate/describe, even in principle. Turing machines are physi-
cally realizable in principle, but the converse (from physically realized devices to Turing
machines) is problematic. This is because we cannot tell precisely what the full com-
ponents of an actual, physically realized device are. It can be more or less impossible
to somehow write down a precise Turing specification based on the physical construct.
For example, in principle, a series of coin tosses could keep giving heads on precisely the
rounds j ∈ S ⊆ N, where S is undecidable. Given a physically realized device, perhaps it
is essentially a Turing machine, but the problem is that it is hard to know which one. Thus
it may be more to the point to make the hypothesis that Turing machines capture the
notion of systematic executability rather than mechanical. Nevertheless, it can of course
even be natural to make the hypothesis that nature is a essentially a Turing machine,
but this does not imply that we understand, simply by looking at physcal systems, what
machine that systems should correspond to. This is especially true if we cannot—and it
seems we cannot—fully isolate the system from its environment.
44Indeed, one could claim that P even defines (or can be considered to define) which
claims hold. And we will indeed consider the scenario where P determines truth.
45More rigorously, we consider the empty model in the signature of ϕ.
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verified nor falsified. The way the procedure P now works is, for its essential
parts, described in [7], proof of Theorem 4.3. The nice thing is that L is a
logic, so our inputs are statements rather than, e.g., binary strings.46
Now, the setting is still quite restrictive, because L does not directly talk
about, e.g., infinite sets. Thus it will not be sensible to equate the setting
with real mathematics. But it can be viewed as a possible formulation
of the strict core of mathematics. The framework based on L is objective,
finitary and captures the notion of systematicity. It indeed fully and formally
captures systematicity if we define systematicity according to the Church-
Turing thesis to correspond to Turing machines. In a sense, systematicity is
also precisely and exactly what logic is all about, so it is possible to entertain
the view that L provides a definition of logicality.47
Note especially that the perspective of using L to define mathematical state-
ments banishes typical incompleteness issues. Every statement ϕ ∈ L corre-
sponds to posing the questions “∅ |=+ ϕ ?” and “∅ |=− ϕ ?”. The answer is
given by P. If ∅ |=+ ϕ, then P outputs yes, and if ∅ |=− ϕ, then P outputs no.
If P diverges,48 then P will not output anything. Indeed, we take P to define
truth and falsity here. Thus there are no true but not verifiable (or false but
unfalsiable) staments. The system defines truth values, nothing external
does. (It is worth noting that the statements where P diverges are simply
considered not to have any truth value—unless divergence/indeterminacy is
a truth value, which is then the truth value of those sentences.)
In conclusion, L gives a possible, strict standard for strict mathematicity (or
logicality, we do not differentiate here). The thesis that logicality equals sys-
tematicity can be appealing, and if systematicity equals Turing executability
(RE), then L hits some fundamental mark. Thus it could be regarded as a
fundamental logic. For those in favour of the perspective that there is a
unique fundamental logic, L could perhaps be one possible candidate. But
of course this requires one to favour (1) the uniqueness thesis; (2) the idea of
logicality being systematicity; (3) the Church-Turing thesis that systematic-
ity is captured by Turing machines; and (4) the position that L should be
a system capturing Turing computation in some fundamentally natural way.
The naturality could be due to the links between L and natural language
and the apparent minimality of L in achieving its central features such as
the structure modification capacities, self-reference, and the containment of
FO. This can be quite a lot to entertain, but seems interesting nevertheless.
46The setting is, however, reasonably similar to equating mathematical statements with
Turing machines with the empty input.
47We do not really differentiate between logicality and mathematicality here, but instead
identify both notions with the notion of rigorous objective systematicity.
48Here divergence is equated with ∅ 6|=+ ϕ and ∅ 6|=− ϕ, i.e., neither player having a
winning strategy.
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4.3 Controlling systems with L and its variants
We have already noticed that the semantic games of L are system evolutions.
This is easy to see—and the system related to one evaluation task (i.e.,
checking, e.g., if M |=+ ϕ) can be realized in many ways. Roughly, we
can take Eloise to be the sole agent and associate Abelard with G.49 The
system constraint function F relates to the constraints given by the formula
evaluated (and the semantic game rules together with the input models).
This is a turn-based game, so we need dummy moves. The current world is
the current model assignment pair, and we can put the remaining situation
specification (where the game is in relation to the evaluated formula, and
who is the current verifier) into mental models.50
This phenomenon has a converse. A typical system controllable by Turing
machines can reasonably naturally be simulated relatively closely in a setting
with a semantic game of L. The key feature of L is the looping operator,
allowing semantic games with indefinitely long plays. The other key feature
is the possibility to modify models and thereby simulate phenomena relating
to the structure evolution in the system modeled. Typically Eloise controls
the main agents for most parts. The choices of the agents can be represented
by direct modifications of the current model. If necessary, we can add a some
novel points and a predicate A that those points satisfy, and then choices can
be represented by, e.g., colouring the elements in A with different singleton
predicates. Intuitively, Abelard controls G and modifies the structures so
that the new current models become as desired. However, many kinds of
modeling solutions can be made, based on what kinds of correspondences
between the original game and the semantic game are desired. Note that
there is no explicit winning notion in any way present in systems, while
semantic games are reachability games. Nevertheless, Eloise and Abelard are
free to make any choices within the rules of the semantic game framework,
and indeed, they are not obliged to try to win the game plays.
To allow more flexibility in model constructions with L, we consider an
extension L[ ; ]. The language is obtained by extending that of L by the
formula construction rule stating that if ψ and ϕ are formulae, then so is ψ ;ϕ.
Intuitively, ‘;’ is a composition operator stating that the left formula must
first be checked and then the right one, but ‘;’ also intuitively corresponds
to a conjunction. Formally, if we encounter ψ ;ϕ, we first play the game
for ψ (with the model and assignment as they are when the formula ψ ;ϕ
49It can also be natural to associate different operators (∃x1, ∃x2, IR(x1,...,xn) etc.)
with different agents. Here one may even want to take into account the polarity of the
operator in each turn, i.e., whether Eloise or Abelard uses the operator, and associate
different modes of use with different agents. Also, a different occurrence (token) of the
same operator in the same formula can be associated with a different agent.
50They can be made part of the current model as well.
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is encountered). The current verifier P (Eloise or Abelard) of ψ ;ϕ has the
task to win the play of the game for ψ. If that play for ψ ends so that P
wins, the game play is continued from ϕ with the possibly modified model
and assignment51 and with P being the verifier for ϕ (despite the possible
changes of verifier in the play for ψ). If the play for ψ does not end, then
neither player wins the entire original play, and if the opponent of P wins the
play for ψ, then the original play ends with the opponent winning. Note that
ψ may have further symbols ‘;’ and jump symbols Ci (so we may even, e.g.,
encounter the very same formula ψ ; ϕ again due to a jump). Each encounter
of ‘;’ has to be resolved first before earlier encounters (that have occurred
earlier in the run of the game play) will be returned to for checking the second
formula ϕ.52 The full game history can be used here to define strategies; in
standard L a positional history is the standard option. Nondeterministic
strategies can be allowed, being winning if every path leads to a win.
This composition operator ‘;’ does not affect the Turing-completeness, as the
old proof applies for translating from logic into Turing computation (and the
direction from Turing computation to logic does not need the composition
operator in the first place). The extended logic offers more flexibility in
simulating model constructions that Turing machines do. The key issue
intuitively is that we can write formulae where Eloise does not have to stop
working on a model simply because Abelalard doubts some true atom, thus
forcing Eloise to win before the model construction has a desired form. A
result concerning model constructions follows. Let us formulate that next.
Let us write M |=+ (ϕ,M) if Eloise has a winning strategy in the game
for ϕ ∈ L[ ; ] and M so that the set of models where the plays end with
that strategy is precisely M. Note that different strategies can produce
different sets. Here we ignore all the symbols outside the signature (first-
order variables and the relation symbols X corresponding to tape symbols)
so the signature of models in M is the same as that of M. There may be
other symbols present (e.g., X) in the final model constructions, but they
do not count.
We say that a nondeterministic TM computes a σ-structure relation if for
every finite σ-structure encoding enc(M) given as input, the machine al-
ways halts (on every computation path) and the collection of the outputs
is enc(N1), . . . , enc(Nk) for some σ-structures N1, . . . ,Nk. Furthermore, for
every M′ isomorphic to M, the output collections with inputs enc(M) and
enc(M′) contain representatives of precisely the same isomorphism classes.
51So the game for ψ can of course modify the model and assignment, and the game for
ϕ is then begun with these modified variants.
52But jumps can of course cause all kinds of intermediate actions including possibly
playing inside the syntactic structure of the second formula.
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Now, for any TM computing a σ-structure relation, there exists a formula ϕ
of L[ ; ] such that the following conditions both hold for all finite σ-structures
M.
1. TM produces, on the input enc(M), encodings of models that define
precisely the collection KM of isomorphism classes.
2. M |=+ (ϕ,MM) with MM defining the collection KM of isomorphism
classes.
The way to establish this is to define a formula ϕ that forces the following
construction. Beginning with the input modelM, the formula ϕ forces Eloise
to construct the computation table with the input enc(M). The newly con-
structed model S has the input model M, the computation table consisting
of word models, and one chosen output model N. (The construction allows
all of the desired output models to be chosen, one output model at a time.)
The computation table as well as M and the output model are coupled with
suitable auxiliary relations so that, e.g., the first and last bit strings in one
branch of the computation table represent the word models corresponding to
enc(M) and enc(N). Also other auxiliary constructs can be added, e.g., to
distinguish the original elements of the input model from the newly added
domain elements. The computation table and the auxiliary relations can be
constructed from tape symbol predicates, but the output model N consists
of signature relations. Once this construction S is ready, a first-order for-
mula ψ is evaluated. The first-order formula asserts that the computation
table and the whole construction is as desired.53 Then the undesired part
(i.e., everything but N) is deleted and finally Eloise wins. All this can be
done using the composition operator which prevents Abelard stopping Eloise
before suitable construction and deletion parts are done. Using the auxiliary
tape symbol predicates helps to distinguish between different construction
parts at different stages of the full procedure.
We note that of course the above construction generally requires looping.
And the construction remotely resembles the way the logic LRE of [10]
achieves Turing-completeness; cf. Proposition 2 there. The logic LRE is
based on an opertor IY that adds a finite set of points to the model and
labels the new points with the unary predicate Y .
It is actually interesting to consider further operators and extensions of that
framework. Firstly, one can allow (1) free use of operators IY , rather than
the prenex restricted single operator allowed in LRE . Furthermore, one can
consider (2) an operator D that simply deletes some number of points from
53Note that the empty set of output models does not feature here, and at least the
empty model is outputted on the logic side anyway. Nevertheless, this could be remedied
with suitable and reasonably natural constructions.
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the model domain; (3) operators (IR) that introduce an arbitrary set of tu-
ples to the relation R within the current model; and (4) an operator (DR)
that deletes an arbitrary set of tuples from the relation R. We conjecture
that adding all these to second-order logic leads to a system that corre-
sponds to the arithmetic hierarchy (in expressivity) in the finite. Of course
one needs to deal again with atoms with first-order variables without a ref-
erence. A natural approach here is to define all such atoms false, so atoms
would basically state the additional condition that the symbols in the atom
have referents, resembling the Russelian approach. This strong but seem-
ingly simple system is very flexible in relation to model constructions, and
especially its fragments are immediately interesting.54
To define more custom-made logics than the very general logics based on L,
let us turn to fragments and further variants. To investigate model transfor-
mations, let us define modifiers. These can be used for jumps from models
to other models, similarly to what happens in L. Modifiers are defined as
follows. Let S be a class of pairs (M,X) where M is a first-order structure
and X an assignment; X can also be a team or a domain point, depending
on the exact application. Futhermore, to streamline our exposition, (M,X)
can even represent a class of structures (N, f) where N is a first-order model
and f an assignment. Such classes (called model sets) are considered in [12].
Now, fix one of the above possible interpretations for structures (M,X).
A modifier m is a map
m : S → P(S)
such that if (M,X) ∼= (N, Y ) for some two elements of S, then there is a
bijective map p : m((M,X)) → m((N, Y )) such that (A, U) ∼= p((A, U)) for
all inputs (A, U) to p. Now, mixing syntax and semantics, (M,X) |= (m)ϕ
iff (N, Y ) |= ϕ for all (N, Y ) ∈ m((M,X)).
Note that if U and V are teams, then (A, U) ∼= (B, V ) if (A, rel (U)) ∼=
(B, rel (V )) and U and V have the same domain. The relations of teams
are determined in the usual way, using the ordering of the subindices of the
variable symbols to determine the internal ordering of tuples. If U and V are
54We note that of course we can also consider DˆY which simply deletes the points in
the extension of the unary relation Y and an operator I that simply adds new domain
points to the model without labeling them. Modifications can also be restricted to the
extension of an input formula. This defines variants of the operators we listed, for example
〈I(ϕ(x, y), R)〉χ would add all pairs that satisfy ϕ(x, y) to the binary relation R, and a
similar deletion operation of course would also be natural. Concerning domain points,
the formula 〈D(ψ(x))〉χ would delete the points that satisfy ψ(x). And the list goes on.
After the modification in each case, χ would be evaluated. To go more directly beyond
first-order logic, one could consider variants where only some nondeterministically chosen
set of tuples/points in the extensions could be added/deleted.
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assignments, then they correspond to singleton teams, so the above specifi-
cation suffices to define ∼=. If U and V are domain points, they correspond
to singleton assigments, so again the case is covered. In the case of model
sets T and T ′, we have an isomorphism if there is a bijective map g from T
to T ′ such that (N, f) is isomophic to g((N, f)) for all inputs (N, f) to g.
Modifiers are a simple way to jump from structures to others. Altering
things a bit, define (M,X) |= 〈m〉ϕ iff (N, Y ) |= ϕ for some (N, Y ) ∈
m((M,X)). One can also consider variants with, e.g., “most.” Going further,
fix some Boolean formula B with k proposition symbols. Define (M,X) |=
((F ))(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk) if and only if the Boolean combination B of the statements
(Ni, Yi) |= ϕi holds for each tuple
((N1, Y1), . . . , (Nk, Yk)) ∈ F ((M,X)),
where F maps from S into P(Sk). Here, if (M,X) ∼= (M′,X ′), then there
is a bijection h : F ((M,X)) → F ((M′,X ′)) such that the jth entry of
((N1, Y1), . . . , (Nk, Yk)) is isomorphic to the jth entry of
h(((N1, Y1), . . . , (Nk, Yk)))
(for all j and all inputs to h).
This last notion of a modifier is quite general, but it still modifies models
independently of the input formulae ϕ1, . . . , ϕk. And there are other limi-
tations. Thus let us define a somewhat more general notion. Let G be a
function from S × (P(S))k into P((P(S))2k). Intuitively, G takes as input
the current structure (M,X) and the truth classes
‖ ϕi ‖ = {(N, Z) ∈ S | (N, Z) |= ϕi}.
The output of G, then, is a collection of 2k-tuples (R+1 ,R
−
1 , . . . ,R
+
k ,R
−
k ) of
classes
R+1 ,R
−
1 , . . . ,R
+
k ,R
−
k ⊆ S.
There should be at least one tuple so that each model in R+i satisfies ϕi
while no model in R−i satisfies ϕi. Intuitively, each tuple approximates a
type consisting of simple satisfaction and negative satisfaction statements.
Thus the collection that G outputs corresponds to a disjunction of types (or
type approximations). So, we indeed define (M,X) |= ((G))(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk) if
and only if for some t := (R+1 ,R
−
1 , . . . ,R
+
k ,R
−
k ) in
G((M,X), ‖ ϕ1 ‖, . . . , ‖ ϕk ‖),
we have (Mi, Yi) |= ϕi for all (Mi, Yi) ∈ R
+
i and (M
′
i, Y
′
i ) 6|= ϕi for all
(M′i, Y
′
i ) ∈ R
−
i (for all i ≤ k obviously).
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Again of course some invariance conditions hold for G. We require that if
(M,X) ∼= (M′,X ′), then there exists a bijection
h : G((M,X), ‖ ϕ1 ‖, . . . , ‖ ϕk ‖)→ G((M
′,X ′), ‖ ϕ1 ‖, . . . , ‖ ϕk ‖)
such that for all tuples
t ∈ G
(
(M,X), ‖ ϕ1 ‖, . . . , ‖ ϕk ‖
)
,
and all j ≤ 2k, there exists a bijection p from the jth entry of t to the jth
entry of h(t) so that each model (N, Y ) in the domain of p is isomorphic to
p((N, Y )).
Such modifiers G are reasonably general, so we call such modifiers g-modifiers,
g for general. Other kinds of invariance conditions could be natural, but we
shall not address that issue here further than a short comment later on below.
We consider one more notion of very closely related operators. We define
operators N such that
(M,X) |= 〈〈H〉〉(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk)
if and only if
(
‖ ϕ1 ‖, . . . , ‖ ϕk ‖
)
∈ N
(
(M,X)
)
. Here N maps from S
into P((P(S))k). A natural invariance here is that if (M,X) and (M′,X ′)
are isomorphic, then there is a bijection h from N(M,X) to N(M′,X ′)
such that for all t ∈ N((M,X)), the jth entry of t and the jth entry of
h(t) are related by a bijection p such that the structures linked via p are
isomorphic. This resembles neighbourhood semantics. We note that it is
of course not necessary to impose the above invariance conditions if not
desired, but that may result in isomorphic structures (M,X) and (M′,X ′)
being non-equivalent.
We note that the above classes of logical constructs (i.e., operators and mod-
ifiers) can be equivalently formulated in terms of functions on isomorphism
classes. We say that F and G are i-similar if they are the same modulo
modifying the involved structures to isomorphic ones. It is also worth not-
ing that natural construct classes arise, e.g., by considering which constructs
are the same modulo permutation of variables (i.e., a bijection from the set
VAR of all variable symbols to VAR itself). F and G are x-similar if they
are the same modulo variable permutations. F and G are similar if they
are the same modulo modifying the involved structures to isomorphic ones
and permuting variables. All the three notions of similarity define relevant
classes of logical constructs that are, in some senses, the same, or have the
same base construct.
Classifying modifiers via L and L[ ; ] can be elucidating and useful, as those
logics modify models one tuple and one domain point at a time. Already the
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self-reference-free fragment of L defines a natural and highly comprehensive
class of simple, finite step modification procedures. Nevertheless, modifiers
can be natural in many contexts. For example, for more flexible studies of
formal systems (as defined above), it would be useful to investigate extensions
of L and its variants with more custom-made model modification steps.
Let us then move on to briefly discuss model sets. The discussion will relate
to knowledge representation and the issues in Section 3.3. Suppose we con-
sider systems where the mental model is the conceived set of possible current
models. This is a classical approach. Now, for those systems, we can directly
use model sets [12]. Using the team semantics of [12] on a first-order formula
ϕ, we have
M |= ϕ if and only if M, f |=FO ϕ for all (M, f) ∈ M,
where M is a model set, i.e., a collection of pairs (M, f) where f is an
assignment. As established in [12], this variant of team semantics gives es-
sentially a semantics for proofs. Disjunction corresponds to splitting into
cases and negation to going from verification to falsification. In Section 3.3
we discussed the possibility of using truncated reasoning when determining
the output of the decision function di. A semantics for proofs can be use-
ful in this context, as typical proof steps—such as splitting into cases—are
reflected in the semantics. It is interesting, e.g., to consider what can be
established with a strongly limited number of such semantic counterparts of
proof steps. All this directly relates to issues in knowledge representation.
Indeed, consider querying under the open world setting. It is all about deal-
ing with very delicate consequence relations. Let us see an example of open
world querying and relate it to model sets.
Let (σ,O, q(x)) be an ontology-mediated query (see [2]). Here we define O
to be an ontology (possibly in some strong logic), σ a signature and q(x) a
query over σ ∪ signature(O). Let F be a σ-database, i.e., a set of literals55
over the signature σ. Let a be a tuple of elements occurring in F . We here
define that F |= (σ,O, q(a)) if and only if M |= q(a) for all models M of the
signature σ ∪ signature(O) such that
1. M |=
∧
O
2. The diagram of M contains F as a subset.
Let M[σ,O,F , x 7→ a] denote this model set (defined by the above two
conditions), with every assignment mapping the elements of x to the respec-
tive elements of a. Then we have M[σ,O,F , x 7→ a] |= q(x) if and only if
F |= (O, σ, q(a)). Thus we can turn the logical consequence issue into model
55Here we allow positive and negative relational facts
38
set satisfaction, which uses the team semantics of model sets. (This obvious
connection of ontology-based data access to model sets was briefly noted in
[14].) As already discussed, all this can be useful when considering different
reasoning notions with limited reasoning capacities and truncated reasoning
patterns. Note that, if desired, we can put even quite severe cardinality
limits to the models in the model set. And we can stay in the finite if we
want to. If we want more complex data than literals, an approach via model
sets can still be used. It is simply about delicate consequence relations, and
model sets relate directly to those.
To seriously study delicate consequence relations used in knowledge repre-
sentation, one must understand very delicate fragments of FO and L, as this
helps in various kinds of classification attempts. For example, antecedent
formulae could be only atoms, while consequent formulae are more elabo-
rate. For such studies, we need tools for flexible, fine-grained classification.
To classify logics in a flexible, delicate and very fine-grained way, it would
be beneficial to have access to related algebraic approaches. These are not
difficult to obtain. In the next section we take some related first steps.
4.3.1 First-order logic and extensions via functions on relations
Here we define an algebraic approach to first-order logic. The system re-
sembles the approach of Codd, but employs a finite signature and considers
standard first-order logic It is also very close to predicate functor logic, but
we also consider some extensions of the system below.
The key is to deal with identities and relation permutations by operations
that operate only in the beginning of tuples. We can arbitrarily permute any
tuple by combining swaps of the first two coordinates with a cyclic permuta-
tion operation. Furthermore, we can identify (i.e., force equal) any two tuple
elements by first bringing the elements to the beginning of a tuple and then
applying an identity operation that checks only the first two coordinates.
What we formally mean by these claims will be of course made clear below.
A first-order formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) defines the relation
{(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A
k |A |= ϕ(a1, . . . , ak) }
over the model A (where A is the domain of A). This requires that the free
variable symbols xi are linearly ordered. Here we let the linear ordering be
associated with the subindices of the variable symbols. Now, what would be
the relation defined by the formula ϕ(x2, . . . , xk+1)? It would be natural to
let it be
{(a2, . . . , ak+1) ∈ A
k |A |= ϕ(a2, . . . , ak+1) }.
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This is precisely the same relation as the relation given by ϕ(x1, . . . , xk)
because we obviously have
{(a2, . . . , ak+1) |A |= ϕ(a2, . . . , ak+1) } = {(a1, . . . , ak) |A |= ϕ(a1, . . . , ak) }.
One way around this is to let formulae define sets of assignment functions,
i.e., the “relation” defined by ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) over A is now
{
(
(x1, a1), . . . , (xk, ak)
)
|A |= ϕ(a1, . . . , ak) }.
And the “relation” defined by ϕ(x2, . . . , xk+1) over A is
{
(
(x2, a2), . . . , (xk+1, ak+1)
)
|A |= ϕ(a2, . . . , ak+1) }.
So, in some sense, first-order formulae do not really define relations over
models but sets of assignments (which could be characterized as index labeled
relations.)56
Now, we shall here work with relations, not sets of assignments. The relation
defined by a first-order formula ϕ in a model A is, strictly speaking, specified
as follows.
1. Let (xi1 , . . . , xik) enumerate exactly all the free variables in ϕ, with
the subindices i1, . . . , ik given in a strictly increasing order.
2. Then the relation defined by ϕ is given by
{(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A
k |A |= ϕ(a1, . . . , ak) }.
Therefore, the relations defined by the (strictly speaking non-equivalent)
formulae ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) and ϕ(x2, . . . , xk+1) will be the same. Note that the
relation defined by a sentence ϕ such that A |= ϕ is the nullary relation
{∅} where ∅ represents the empty tuple. The relation defined by a sentence
χ such that A 6|= χ is the nullary empty relation. We suppose there is a
different empty relation for each arity, starting with arity zero. This way
the complement of the completement of the total k-ary relation is the total
k-ary relation itself. We lose no information about the arity. We also assume
that models must have a non-empty domain.
We will next define functions that map relations in A to relations in A.
We will then show that this approach defines exactly the same relations as
first-order logic.
56It is worth noting that relational database theory is not based on relations but these
kinds of labeled relations.
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4.3.2 Functions on relations
Consider the algebraic signature (u, I,¬, p, s,∃, J) where
1. u is a nullary symbol,57
2. I,¬, p, s,∃ have arity one,
3. J has arity two.
To consider models with relation symbols R1, . . . , Rk, add R1, . . . , Rk to be
nullary symbols in the algebraic signature, just like u. Terms are built from
variable symbols and the constants (nullary symbols u,R1, . . . , Rk) using
the symbols I,¬, p, s,∃, J in the usual way to compose new terms. Below we
will consider only terms without variable symbols and use the word “term”
to refer to such terms.
Given a model A, every term T defines some relation T A ⊆ Ak where A is
the domain of A. Let us look at the semantics of terms. Let T be a term
and suppose we have defined a relation T A. Then the following conditions
hold.
Ri ) Here Ri is a k-ary relation symbol in the signature of A, which is a
nullary term in the algebraic signature. The nullary term is interpreted
to be the relation RA, i.e., the relation
{(a1, . . . , ak) |A |= R(a1, . . . , ak) }.
This is natural indeed.58
u ) We define uA = A. The constant u is referred to as the universal unary
relation constant.
I ) If T A is of arity at least two, we define
(I (T ))A = {(a1, . . . , ak) | (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ T
A and a1 = a2}.
If T A is a unary or a nullary relation, we define (I (T ))A = T A. The
function I is referred to as the identity operator, or equality operator.
¬ ) We define
(¬(T ))A = {(a1, . . . , ak) | (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A
k \ T A },
57Recall that nullary function symbols in an algebraic signature represent constants.
58Note here that if Ri is a nullary relation symbol, R
A is either {∅} or ∅0 corresponding
to true and false, respectively. Here ∅0 is the nullary empty relation. The empty tuple is
identified with ∅ in {∅}.
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where we recall that A0 = {∅} in the case where k is zero.59 The
operator ¬ is referred to as the negation operator or complementation
operator. Recall that the empty relation is different for each arity.
p ) If T A is of arity at least two, we define
(p(T ))A = {(a2, . . . , ak, a1) | (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ T
A },
where the k-tuple (a2, . . . , ak, a1) is the one obtained from the k-tuple
(a1, . . . , ak) by simply moving the first element a1 to the end of the
tuple. If T A is a unary or a nullary relation, we define (p(T ))A =
T A. The function p is referred to as the permutation operator, or
cyclic permutation operator.
s ) If T A is of arity at least two, we define
(s(T ))A = {(a2, a1, a3, . . . , ak) | (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ T
A },
where the k-tuple (a2, a1, a3, . . . , ak) is the one obtained from the k-
tuple (a1, . . . , ak) by swapping the first two elements a1 and a2 and
keeping the other elements as they are. If T A is a unary or a nullary
relation, we define (s(T ))A = T A. The function s is referred to as the
swap operator.
∃ ) If T A has arity at least one, we define
(∃(T ))A = {(a2, . . . , ak) | (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ T
A for some a1 ∈ A },
where (a2, . . . , ak) is the (k − 1)-tuple obtained by removing the first
element of the tuple (a1, . . . , ak). When T
A is a nullary relation, we
define (∃(T ))A = T A. The function ∃ is referred to as the existence
operator.
J ) We define
(J(T ,S))A =
{(a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bℓ) | (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ T
A and (b1, . . . , bℓ) ∈ S
A}.
Here we note that if k = 0 and thus (a1, . . . , ak) = ∅ (the empty tuple),
then (a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bℓ) represents the tuple (b1, . . . , bℓ). Similarly,
if ℓ = 0, then (b1, . . . , bℓ) = ∅ and (a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bℓ) represents
(a1, . . . , ak). When both k and ℓ are zero, (a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bℓ) rep-
resents the empty tuple ∅. The function J is referred to as the join
operator.
59When k = 0, the tuple (a1, . . . , ak) represents the empty tuple ∅.
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The terms that can be formed using the above symbols will be called l-terms
(l for logic). If ϕ and an l-term define exactly the same relation over every
model A (in a signature interpreting the required symbols), then ϕ and the
l-term are called l-equivalent.
The following theorem bears some similarity to Codd’s theorem. However,
we discuss standard first-order logic and have a somewhat different operator
set (and we concentrate on relations rather than sets of assignments). Our
signature is finite (provided that there are only finitely many relation symbols
Ri in the signature of the models A considered).
Theorem 4.2. For every first-order formula ϕ, there exists an l-equivalent
l-term. Vice versa, for every l-term, there exists an l-equivalent first-order
formula.
Proof. Let ϕ be a first-order formula. We need to find the corresponding
algebraic term. If ϕ is ⊤, the corresponding term is ∃u, and if ϕ is ⊥, the
term is ¬∃u. If ϕ is some formula x = x, then the term u will do. If ϕ is a
formula x = y, then the corresponding term is I(J(u, u)).
Now suppose ϕ is R(xi1 , . . . , xik), where k ≥ 0. Assume first that no variable
symbol in the tuple (xi1 , . . . , xik) gets repeated.
60 Assume also that the
(subindices of the) variable symbols in (xi1 , . . . , xik) are linearly ordered
(i.e., strictly increasing) from left to right. Then the term corresponding to
ϕ is simply R.
Consider then the cases where the tuple (xi1 , . . . , xik) in R(xi1 , . . . , xik) may
contain repetitions and the variables may not necessarily be in an increasing
order. Firstly, note that we can permute any relation arbitrarily by using
the operators p and s. To see this, note the following two facts.
1. In a tuple (a1, . . . , ai, . . . , aℓ), we can move the element ai any number
n of steps to the right—keeping the tuple otherwise in the same order—
as follows.
(a) Apply p repeatedly so that ai becomes the leftmost element.
(b) Apply the composed function ps (meaning “s first and then p”)
exactly n times.
(c) Repeatedly apply p until the tuple is in the desired configuration.
2. Moving ai to the left is no different from moving it to the right, as
moving to the left corresponds to moving to the right and past the end
of the tuple. Thus moving n steps to the left is achieved by the above
steps a,b,c, with the combined function ps applied exactly ℓ − n − 1
times in step b.
60Thus for example R(x1, x1, x2) is not allowed in this case as it repeats x1.
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Thus we can move a single element anywhere, keeping the rest of the tuple
in order. Thereby we can, one by one, move elements where we like, and
thus all permutations can indeed be achieved using s and p only.
Notice then that since we can permute relations arbitrarily, also repetitions
of variables can be dealt with. The idea is simply to bring element pairs to
the left end of tuples, after which we can use the indentity operator I to get
rid of tuples without the desired repetition. For example, it is easy to see
that R(x2, x1, x2) corresponds to the term p ∃ Ip p(R). It is easy to see how
to systematically produce translations of all atoms by using combinations of
p, s, ∃ and I.
To translate a conjunction, suppose by induction that we have translations
T (ψ) and T (χ) for ψ and χ. Let ψ ∧ χ be the formula ϕ to be translated.
Now, J(T (ψ),T (χ)) is almost what we need. The only thing we need ad-
ditionally to take into account is the possibility of having repeated symbols
that occur in both ψ and χ and also the ultimate order of the variable sym-
bols. Thus, similarly to the case for atoms, we apply p, s, ∃ and I (often
repeatedly) to the term J(T (ψ),T (χ)) to get the required term.
Translating a negation is trivial, we translate ¬ψ to the term ¬(T (ψ)) where
T (ψ) is obtained from the induction hypothesis. Translating a quantifier ∃xi
is similarly easy. However, we may first have to do some preprocessing as
the variable xi can refer to some other than the first position in the relation
corresponding to the quantified formula. Thus, suppose we want to translate
∃xiψ and we have a translation T (ψ) of ψ by the induction hypothesis. Now
use p (typically repeatedly) to make the coordinate corresponding to xi the
leftmost coordinate in the relation tuples, obtaining a term pn(T (ψ)), where
n denotes how many times p was repeated. Then use ∃ and use p again
(typically repeatedly) to put the remaining tuple into the right order. Thus
the ultimate term is of type pm∃ pn(T (ψ)).
The direction from terms to first-order logic is straightforward.
This representation of first-order logic can be used to obtain very fine-grained
classifications of first-order fragments. Thus it can be a fruitful starting
point for novel classifications of different decidability and complexity issues
of first-order fragments.61 For example, it seems plausible to expect that
some fragments with fluted-logic-like properties can be obtained via dropping
the swap operator s. Anyway, there are many ways to directly apply the
framework, and it should be a nice and useful setting for building decidability
61Of course complexities can vary based on which formalism is used. One can use the
algebraic formalism for classifying first-order fragments for sure, but one can also directly
use and study the algebraic formalism itself and complexity issues within it.
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and complexity classifications based on simply and clearly specified fine-
grained classifications of syntax.
The algebraic approach generalizes to second-order logic quite directly. There
we can make use of relations whose tuples have individuals and relations.
We leave this for later. Instead, let us define a general operator within
this framework. It is now particularly easy as the algebraic framework is
indeed very simple. So, let F be a map that takes as input any tuple
(M,R1, . . . , Rk) where M is a set and each Ri a relation over M . Note
that the collection of inputs is indeed all tuples (M,R1, . . . , Rk) so the re-
lations Ri can have any sequence of arities for different inputs (but k is
fixed). The output F ((M,R1, . . . , Rk)) is then some relation over M . The
invariance condition is simply that if (M,R1, . . . , Rk) and (M
′, R′1, . . . , R
′
k)
are isomorphic62 via f : M → M ′, then so are (M,F ((M,R1, . . . , Rk)))
and (M,F ((M ′, R′1, . . . , R
′
k))) (also via f). We now add terms F (t1, . . . , tk)
to the picture, and the semantics obviously defines (F (t1, . . . , tk))
M to be
F (tM1 , . . . , t
M
k ).
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